This paper studies gender wage di¤erentials in Italy by providing a structural estimation of the frictional parameters of two di¤erent theoretical speci…-cations of an equilibrium search model. I alternatively allow for …rm heterogeneity and discrimination empirically using maximum likelihood and matching …rst moments in the data. Results indicate substantial di¤erences in transition parameters with higher level of search frictions for women. The mapping from productivity to wages for men is highly non linear, with high productivity …rms o¤ering proportionally higher wages; for women, the relationships is almost linear. Including discrimination, I …nd that productivity accounts for 61% of the wage o¤er di¤erential, search for 28% and 11% is the part of discrimination.
Introduction
The empirical labour literature has paid particular attention to gender wage differentials, as these have been frequently associated with discrimination in labour markets (see Altonji and Blank, 1999) . However, identi…cation of discrimination as source of such di¤erentials with standard econometric tools is not a simple task. The problem is that discrimination is only one possible explanation for observed gender wage di¤erentials; other possibilities being productivity di¤erentials and di¤erent search behaviour of men and women. 1 As a consequence, if one wants to identify a measure of discrimination, it is di¢ cult to rely on the estimated coe¢ cient of the gender dummy in wage regressions. One possibility for analysing these issues is that of using and estimating an equilibrium search model. In that context, all three sources of wage di¤erentials are present as an explanation for wage dispersion. What is more, estimation of structural behavioural parameters, both with maximum likelihood techniques and matching …rst moments in the data, guarantees exact identi…cation. Equilibrium conditions can be then be used to decompose observed wage di¤erentials due to search frictions, productivity di¤erentials and discrimination. Productivity and transition probabilities di¤erentials are the two main determinants of wage di¤er-entials across workers in equilibrium search models, both are assumed exogenous. However, some recent contributions in the literature explicitly include another determinant of wage di¤erentials: taste discrimination as studied in Becker (1971) is a further ingredient to explain race and gender wage di¤erentials. 2 The literature dealing with structural estimation of search models is now rapidly increasing and well established (see Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2007) . Despite this fact, quite a few contributions look at gender wage di¤erentials in this speci…c framework. Bowlus (1997) studies gender wage di¤erentials using US data. The paper estimates an equilibrium model decomposing the wage di¤erential into productivity and search components …nding that productivity di¤erentials explain about 70% of the wage gap, and the rest is search frictions. However, the paper explicitly doesn't take discrimination into account. Two papers that try to disentangle the role of unobserved productivity di¤erentials, search frictions and discrimination are Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and Flabbi (2005) . The former deals with race di¤erentials while the second explicitly looks at gender di¤eren-tials. However this is not the only di¤erence between the two studies. Although the papers share the same basic aim of disentangling di¤erentials in productiv-ity, search and discrimination components, they basically di¤er in the theoretical structure and estimation approach. Both look at the share of prejudiced employers and their disutility factor upon hiring a worker from the minority group, however, the former uses a wage posting mechanism for wage o¤ers and doesn't have any source of spillover e¤ect from prejudiced to unprejudiced employers; the second, using a search-matching-bargaining framework, is able to reproduce the spillover e¤ect. As a result, women's outside options are reduced at any employer, determining wage discrimination. Finally the two papers are estimated by using di¤erent methods. While Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) match …rst moments in the data, Flabbi (2005) estimates structural parameters by maximum likelihood. The latter methodology is able to …t the wage distribution quite satisfactorily, while the former identi…es parameters assuming increasing densities for wage o¤ers and earnings distributions. 3 This paper provides a structural estimation of the relevant parameters of the equilibrium search model with frictions by using two di¤erent theoretical structures. First a model with …rm heterogeneity in productivity without discrimination is estimated, then a model with no dispersion in productivity and discrimination in considered. The former approach assumes men and women are in separate labour markets and …rms with di¤erent productivity o¤er di¤erent wages to workers; the latter analyses a labour market in which all men and women have the same productivity but there are gender di¤erences and discrimination. The empirical application is performed on Italian administrative data from INPS.
In the …rst part of the paper, after a non-parametric estimation of the distribution of earnings; I recover a structural estimate of frictional parameters of the equilibrium model using maximum likelihood techniques as proposed by Bontemps et al. (2000) . Conditional on previous steps, I look at the relationship between productivity and wages separately for men and women. The second part of the paper is devoted to estimate structural parameters matching …rst moments in the data by using again structural equilibrium relationships as proposed by Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) . In this context, I assume men and women can have di¤erent productivity, but the distribution of productivity is not dispersed. Using their identi…cation strategy, a measure of the number of discriminating …rms and their disutility parameter upon employing women are estimated.
The main …ndings of the paper can be summarised as follows. The job …nding rate is much higher for unemployed workers than for employed ones, both for men and women. The former is estimated ten times higher than the latter. As a consequence the frictions parameter, expressed as the ratio between the arrival rates of o¤ers while employed and the job destruction rate, is very low. Important di¤er-ences in the speed of climbing the wage ladder between men and women are found. This quantity measure of search frictions is equal to 0.5 for men and 0.2 for women when using maximum likelihood techniques. The mapping from productivity to wages indicates again interesting di¤erences across workers. For men, the relation is highly non linear, with high productivity …rms o¤ering proportionally higher wages, while for women, the relationship is almost linear. This suggest …rms have quite di¤erent wage policies in recruitment and retention for men and women. Finally, explicitly taking into account discrimination, by matching moments in the data, results indicate the relative contribution of the search, productivity and discrimination is di¤erent for the wage o¤er and earnings distribution. In the …rst case, productivity accounts for 61% of wage di¤erentials, while the part of search is 28% and 11% is the component of discrimination. The earnings distribution is di¤erently a¤ected: the relative contributions are 48%, 24% and 28% respectively. Interestingly, productivity di¤erences are more relevant for wage o¤ers than for earnings distribution, while discrimination is much more important to explain the earnings gap. The role of search behaviour is very similar in both cases.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section two I brie ‡y discuss the theoretical equilibrium search model with productivity dispersion across …rms and the model with taste discrimination. Then, in section three I describe the data and the selection of the sample. The estimation method, results and comparison with those in the literature are also provided. In the last section, I conclude and discuss some policy issues.
Theory
In this section, I provide a brief description of the equilibrium search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) . The model is also separately extended to include …rms'heterogeneity (Bontemps et al., 2000) and discrimination (Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002 ). Both extensions are used for empirical estimation. It is important to stress from the onset, these are quite di¤erent representation of the labour market, however both of them have search frictions as essential component of the model. 4 Heterogeneity in productivity is essential to obtain a reasonable …t of the wage distribution and allows to analyze the relation between wages and productivity. Men and women belong to separate labour markets in this setup. On the other hand, including discrimination and assuming there is a fraction of …rms that have a disutility taste parameter towards women, helps to better explain the gender wage di¤erential. However, in this case, although the model is identi…ed, it has the counterfactual implication of increasing densities for wage o¤er and earnings distribution. 5 
Productivity Dispersion
The labour market is populated by workers and …rms, the large number of identical …rms is measure 1; m is the large number of workers in the market. They are all identical; however, some of them are employed and some others are unemployed. Let u denote the number of unemployed. Job search can occur in both states; the probability of receiving an o¤er is distributed according to a standard Poisson process where u is the arrival rate of job o¤ers while unemployed and e when employed. The search strategy has the reservation property, R is the reservation wage when unemployed, and the wage w is the reservation wage when employed. If unemployed a worker has utility ‡ow given by b, the latter has the standard interpretation as the value of leisure or the level of unemployment bene…t per period. No heterogeneity in the value of leisure is assumed. When employed, workers earn their wage w and p is the ‡ow revenue generated per employed worker, total surplus from matching is p b, a …rm earns p w when the job is …lled, while a worker gets w b: Exogenous productivity shocks destroy jobs with arrival rate . It is useful to de…ne k u = u = and k e = e = . The latter is the key parameter of the model and is a quantity measure of the level of search frictions in the market (Ridder and Van den Berg, 2003) .
Let F (w) represent the distribution of wages o¤ered to workers and G(w) the distribution of wages actually paid to employed workers, i.e., the earnings distribution. There is a structural relationship between the two regulated by search frictions parameters that reads as
The fraction of workers receiving a wage less or equal to w is given by the fraction of …rms o¤ering that particular wage (or less) divided by the probability that the job is either destroyed for exogenous reasons or the worker quits for a better o¤er. This is the most important relationship that I use in the empirical application. Firms post wage in the support of the wage o¤er distribution F (w). Denote l(wjR; F ) as the measure of workers per …rm earning a wage w given R and F: That speci…es the steady state number of workers available to a …rm o¤ering a particular wage conditional on the wage o¤ered by other …rms, represented by F; and the workers'reservation wage R. Firms can o¤er higher wages and make less pro…ts per workers but increase l(w); viceversa, o¤ering lower wages make more pro…ts per worker but face more turnover.
Finally, following Bontemps et al. (2000) , assume now that …rms are heterogeneous with respect to their labour productivity parameter p: In this setting, …rms maximise pro…t by choosing w; given productivity. From the …rst order condition of the …rm maximisation problem, it is then possible to determine the …rm's value of the exogenous productivity parameter at each …rm
The parameter p is an important measure of the marginal product of a worker in a competitive equilibrium. As search frictions vanish, the parameter k e increases, and the gap between wages and productivity disappears. It is important to stress, the distribution of productivity is assumed to be exogenous and there is no other production factor in the model. Firm heterogeneity is essential to get a good …t of the wage distribution.
Discrimination
In what follows, I discuss in more detail the model when discrimination is explicitly taken into account as proposed by Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) . In this case, there are two types of workers, M and W . There is a proportion of the latter and 1 of the former. Workers di¤er by gender and productivity with P M P W as type M workers can have higher skill level. 6 Firms maximise utility that depends on pro…ts and preferences over type of workers. There is a fraction d of …rms having a disutility d upon hiring a type W worker, while the remaining proportion is unprejudiced …rms. Both and d are exogenously given. In this setting arrival rates are in ‡uenced by preferences of employers towards workers'types. To model this, a proportional factor 0 x 1 is added to the model. If x = 0, prejudiced …rms do not search for W type workers, while if x = 1 (d = 0 and d = 0) arrival rates are the same across workers. In general, arrival rates di¤er by x. Exogenous job destruction rates di¤er by assumption W M : In this context, …rms can post di¤erent wages for each type of worker. What is more, since …rms'pro…ts are additive in workers'types, it is possible to solve separately for ‡ows and wage o¤er distributions for each worker's type. In particular, for workers of type M , both prejudiced and unprejudiced …rms post the same wage o¤er distribution; the latter is equal as the one in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) , with increasing o¤er and earnings densities. Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) show that wage distributions for type W workers is a (non degenerate) mixture of two distinct distributions, in which prejudiced …rms o¤er lower wages, and unprejudiced …rms o¤er higher wages. In this context, productivity di¤erentials in ‡uence the conditional mean of the distribution, while discrimination determines the bottom of the wage distribution.
The identi…cation strategy is based on the following idea. In the case of pure productivity di¤erentials, distributions are identical, but the one for men is shifted to the right, so that the distance is determined by the di¤erence between productivities; in the case of discrimination, the distance is determined by the number of prejudiced …rms, by the disutility parameter, and by the di¤erence in recruitment activity of …rms for men and women. Predictions regarding the evolution of the di¤erential as one moves to the top of the distributions are di¤erent in the pure productivity case and the pure discrimination case. The model is able to characterise wage, job duration and unemployment di¤erentials across men and women.
Empirical Analysis
The empirical estimation of equilibrium search models as Burdett and Mortensen (1998) is mainly based on worker's data. Necessary information for empirical analysis is observed duration in unemployment and employment, accepted and earned wages, and exit state after employment. The relevant unknown parameters to be estimated are: b, the workers'common value of leisure or non market time; p, the …rms'common value of productivity; the two ratios k u and k e (or u and e alternatively); and the job separation (or destruction) rate . If b is unobserved then, R is the …fth parameter.
However, the model in its simple version has the well-known counterfactual implication that theoretical densities for wage o¤er and earnings distribution are increasing and left skewed. The predicted shape is di¤erent from the expected cross sectional earnings distribution observed in the data, characterised by a very long right tail. As discussed in section 2.1, to …t the real wage distribution some heterogeneity in …rm productivity is needed. This allows to obtain a reasonable …t and also, exploiting structural equilibrium relations, obtain a measure of productivity at each …rm.
If discrimination is considered, identi…cation is still possible, but the model has the same counterfactual implication of the standard Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model. In this case, men and women can have di¤erent search parameters and di¤erent productivity. Before discussing in detail the estimation methods and identi…cation issues, in the next subsection, I brie ‡y present the data.
Data
In this study, I use a matched employer-employee data base from Italian Administrative Archives representative of the population of employed workers in the private non-farm sector. The source of information is the National Social Security Institute (INPS). 7 In this data, as in other matched employer-employee data sets, each worker and each …rm are identi…ed by a speci…c code during their permanence in the administrative …les. For every match, a new code, composed of the union of the …rm and worker codes, is created. As the match is destroyed, the worker and the …rm still continue maintaining their previous code. This data contains all the relevant information I need to estimate an equilibrium search model. 8 For workers, information on sex, age, tenure, number of weeks paid and wages earned is available. On the …rm side, it is possible to have information on the size of the workforce (average number of employees during the year), the (mean) earnings of those workers, the geographical location, and the sector of activity. 9 No information regarding education is available. However, the main di¢ culty with this data set is related to the de…nition of the status of a worker and his/her classi…cation. While the position while employed is illuminating about the actual position in the labour market, on the other hand, if the worker exits the market, it is impossible to know if the subsequent period of absence from the records is due to unemployment, work in the public sector, self-employment or retirement. Although in the paper I refer to unemployment for exposition reasons, it is important to remember that this state has to be interpreted as "out of sample." Finally, as is common in most administrative datasets, no information is provided about the nature of job separation, i.e., it is not possible knowing exactly if the worker has been laid o¤ or the end of the job has been determined by a voluntary separation. In what follows I carefully explain how these problems are overcome in the empirical application.
To estimate the relevant parameters of the equilibrium search model I use a sub-sample of workers observed during a the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . I look at the current status of all workers in the sample in February 1991. Workers are then classi…ed as employed or unemployed. For each worker I observe elapsed and residual duration in the state (employment or unemployment), the wage actually earned or accepted when exiting unemployment and, for those employed, the next transition to another job or unemployment (or censoring).
In Tables 1 and 2 I report descriptive statistics for the sample used in the estimation. I restrict my attention to workers aged 15-50 and divide them in three age groups. Apprentices are excluded as are part time workers. Finally I trim the lowest 1% and highest 99% of men's and women's tails of the overall monthly wage distribution. 10 Some remarkable di¤erences emerge confronting men and women. First, the proportion of unemployed is higher for the latter, about 19% against 16%; second, the duration of unemployment is slightly higher, one month on average. Average wages are about 22% higher for men, and dispersion is also higher with the percentile ratio equal to 2.35 against 2.09. I now turn to describe the estimation method used for structural parameters and productivity distributions. 
Likelihood Function
The estimation method used in this section is based on Bontemps et al. (2000) . I refer to this method as a nonparametric one. Workers can be employed or unemployed. To denote their status in February 1991, I use a binary variable i = 0; 1. Employment and unemployment durations are de…ned by t i , the subscripts b and f stand for backward and forward respectively, to denote durations before and after February 1991. Then, t ib and t if represent durations with i = 0; 1: De…ne left and right censored observations for those spells in progress in January 1985 and December 1996. Let d ib and d if denote those indicators. For each worker in the sample I observe either the wage paid in February 1991 w 1 ; or accepted wage upon exiting unemployment w 0 . As Eckstein and Van den Berg (2007) claim, the former is a random draw from G while the latter is a random draw from F . Workers employed in February 1991 can subsequently exit to another job (job-tojob transition) or to unemployment. Following Contini (2002) , I arbitrarily de…ne as job-to-job transitions those moves with an intervening period of unemployment less or equal to one month. 12 The likelihood function is derived by strictly following the theoretical model and multiplying individual observations. In this model, unemployment duration has exponential distribution with parameter u ; the probability of a draw for unemployed workers is u=m = 1=(1 + k u ). Finally, when the worker leaves unemployment, he/she draws from the wage o¤er distribution F (w). For this group of 10 Following Contini (2002), yearly wages are de ‡ated with the CPI at 1996 prices. Then, to make them comparable across workers with di¤erent number of days worked during the year, the following adjustment is adopted: realwage=(yearly wage/days paid)*26 where 26 is the average number of days worked during the month. The overall sample selection procedure is available upon request. 11 In Sulis (2004), I use this estimation procedure to analyse regional labour market di¤erentials. Results for men are also reported in that paper. 12 See also Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) for French data. workers, the likelihood is
The probability of sampling an employed individual is 1 u=m = k u =(1 + k u ).
The job duration, given the wage w 1 ; is exponentially distributed with parameter , while the employment relationship has exponential duration with parameter + e F (w 1 ), where F (w 1 ) = 1 F (w): The likelihood for employed workers reads as
When heterogeneity in productivity is considered, the model is identi…ed as follows. Frictional parameters u ; e ; and are identi…ed from unemployment durations, employment durations terminating into another job and those terminating to unemployment respectively. The reservation wage R is identi…ed as the lowest wage observed in the sample. Finally, the distribution of productivity can be identi…ed by using wage data and estimated frictional parameters (see Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2007).
The nonparametric estimation procedure proposed by Bontemps et al. (2000) can be summarised in three steps. First I estimate G(w) and g(w) using a nonparametric procedure. I use a standard Gaussian kernel estimator for the density and the empirical cumulative distribution for G(w). Let b G and b g denote such estimates. Conditional on k e , consistent estimates of F and f are
and
Second, replace F and f in the likelihood function by the preceding expressions, and maximize the likelihood with respect to k u , k e , and . Finally, estimate p using the equation below
where p represents a …rm-speci…c constant value of productivity.
The estimation routine has two parts. In the …rst one, transition parameters are estimated by looking at workers and their states in the market. In the second part, conditional on previous steps, a measure of productivity is estimated for each …rm. Note the procedure doesn't need any assumption regarding the distribution of productivity.
Results
In this subsection, I analyse results obtained by estimating the equilibrium model with …rm heterogeneity using the nonparametric procedure discussed above. In this case, search frictions parameters and the relationship between wages paid and productivity are the most important results I look at. I also consider the di¤erent role of search frictions at various experience levels for men and women.
The …rst empirical test of the equilibrium search model has a theoretical motivation. Equation (1) has a clear prediction about the shape of earnings and wage o¤er distributions: the earnings distribution has to …rst order stochastically dominate the wage o¤er distribution. This is because there is on-the-job search and workers can move to better paying jobs. In Figure 1 this prediction is veri…ed with an eyeball-test using standard kernel estimations of the two densities. For both men and women, the earnings distribution is shifted to the right, indicating that higher wages are more likely to be earned for those employed in February 1991 (see Christensen et al., 2005) . The distribution of accepted wages after unemployment is instead more concentrated at lower wages. Interestingly, the women's o¤er distribution is bimodal, with a small group of women earning very low wages. One plausible explanation for this is heterogeneity in reservation wages, probably related to homework and transitions in the labour market. This nonparametric estimation is a …rst necessary step before estimating frictional parameters; it shows interesting di¤erences between men and women.
In Tables 3 and 4 estimation results for transition parameters are presented. Arrival rates de…ne transition parameters and represent probabilities of an event. In this case, the probability of receiving an o¤er is distributed according to a standard Poisson process where u is the arrival rate of job o¤ers while unemployed and e when employed; is the arrival rate of destruction rates. Interpretation of these parameters suggests that the inverse of these is the expected duration of unemployment and jobs. The parameter k e = e = is a quantity and it is a measure of search frictions describing the speed at which workers climb the job and wage ladder. As Ridder and Van den Berg (2003) suggest, k e equals the average number of job o¤ers in a given spell of employment, since the average duration of a spell of employment is 1= , and job o¤ers arrive according to a Poisson process with parameter e , this quantity is the index of search frictions that enters the distribution of wage o¤ers. .0006
.0008 The …rst interesting result that holds for both groups is that of an arrival rate of acceptable wage o¤ers when employed much lower than the one when unemployed; u 's estimate for the all sample is almost ten times larger than e : According to these …gures, the estimated average duration of unemployment is equal to about 24 months, with a slight higher duration for women. 13 On the other hand, the average duration of an employment relationship terminated by the worker with a quit is equal to 156 months for men and more than 310 months for women. This indicates that on-the-job search activity is very low and that job search reveals much more pro…table when unemployed. On the other hand, the job destruction rate is estimated close to 0.012 for men and 0.015 for women, with an average duration of the job of 83 months for males. Finally, k e = e = gives a measure of the speed at which workers climb the wage and job ladder. It can be also interpreted as the average number of o¤ers received in a given spell of employment. The search frictions index is equal to 0.5 for a random male worker in this sample and to 0.2 for a representative women. Results for the overall sample highlight important di¤erences in transition parameters between men and women. As expected, job change behaviour seems to be in ‡uenced by gender speci…c factors.
Women
Until now, workers have been treated as homogeneous, however they certainly di¤er according to some observable and unobservable characteristics that a¤ect their labour market outcomes. Strati…cation of the sample according to worker characteristics can give some indication of the di¤erence in the degree of search frictions that workers face when looking for a job. Results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate interesting di¤erences among di¤erent occupations and age groups. Apprentices are excluded from the sample, as are managers for women, as they are too few. As expected, managers (only men) rank very high in the probability of getting outside o¤ers, their estimated arrival rate of job opportunities is equal to 0.06 per month with an average value of the search friction parameter greater than 5. On the other hand, job destruction rates are almost constant across di¤erent groups with a somewhat higher rate for blue collars. Strati…cation by di¤erent age groups gives interesting results with higher job destruction rate for young workers and higher probability of move for them. For men, results in the last column of the Table also con…rm well known …ndings about the concave relationship between wage and experience in the labour market, with an increasing pro…le in early stages of the career and with a ‡attening in later stages. For women instead, the relationship is increasing with age. Looking more in detail at estimates, note that the job destruction rate is quite similar for men and women. On the other hand, the estimated arrival rate of o¤ers is almost constant across age groups for women while for men is reduced as workers get older. This result can have an interesting interpretation regarding di¤erent job search behaviour of the two groups. While for men the career path is a standard one with diminishing arrival rates when older; for women, the arrival rate is constant indicating their move can be less related to money reasons. This result can be also attributed to the fact that, in this model, search intensity doesn't vary with the wage, determining a constant arrival rate of o¤ers at any wage level; this e¤ect is stronger for women. Figure 2 looks at the estimated mapping between productivity and o¤ered wages. The estimated relationship is increasing at all levels of productivity as predicted by the model. However, this Figure reveals interesting di¤erences among men and women. While the relationship for men is not linear, but is best approximated by a cubic with an in ‡ection point at median productivity levels, for women the relationship is close to a linear one. This can have important implications for our understanding of the gender wage di¤erential.
In fact, previous results presented above con…rm that men and women exhibit important di¤erent transition patterns. This is re ‡ected in the wage o¤er and earnings distributions. However, this in ‡uences also the mapping from productivity to wages for men and women. Given there are imperfections in the market, and women face higher level of search frictions, …rms can o¤er di¤erent wages. However, …rms also o¤er di¤erent wages to workers with di¤erent productivity. For men, lower level of search frictions indicates their labour supply elasticity is higher, so that …rms have to o¤er proportionally higher wages to attract or retain them; on the contrary, women have much lower chances and even high productivity …rms do not need to o¤er the convex wage-productivity pro…le discussed above. Again, this di¤erential result can be also attributed to the fact that here search intensity doesn't vary at di¤erent part of the wage distribution. 14 In general, above results indicate …rms do exert a strong monopsony power when posting wages. The latter is de…ned as the percentage di¤erence between the wage and productivity and gives a direct measure of the degree of exploitation of labour market frictions by …rms when setting wages. The monopsony condition can be theoretically identi…ed as one of very low mobility and almost no search while on-the-job. The model gives also a measure of the proportion of the rents that accrue to workers when starting an employment relationship, or how far are workers from being paid their marginal product p: Results indicate that …rms are able to extract almost all the surplus from their workers, in particular from women. This can be easily interpreted in the theoretical framework proposed in this paper. Given very low levels of on-the-job search and a few opportunities to move to better paying jobs, …rms are able to extract all the surplus from their workers paying them wages just above their value of leisure. However, the pattern is somewhat di¤erent for low productivity and high productivity …rms. The mapping from productivity to wages in Figure 2 indicates that high productivity …rms o¤er to Women men proportionally higher wages compared to those paid by …rms in the lower part of the distribution. For women that is not the case.
Previous results indicate that the degree of search frictions in Italian labour market is considerable and is a relevant source of gender wage di¤erentials. Workers face di¢ culties in climbing the job ladder and …rms are able to exploit the monopsony power that accrues to them because of the presence of information problems in the market. Women su¤er more from this condition. Estimates of transition parameters indicate that segmentation of the labour market by observable characteristics of workers can help us to identify those groups that are more severely damaged in this context. Results found for di¤erent age groups and for di¤erent occupation categories con…rm previous expectations and highlight important di¤erences between men and women in their career paths.
The Relative E¤ect of Productivity, Search and Discrimination
In this subsection, instead I follow estimation procedures from Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) . I solve the following system to estimate , u , e , and P to match moments observed in the data. 15 The reservation wage R is assumed to be the lowest wage observed in the sample. The basic system, based on the theoretical model is described below 1. unemployment duration
2. unemployment rate
3. proportion from job to unemployment
4. average wage of cross section earnings distribution
15 I solve numerically the systems below with Maple. Detailed computations are available upon request. As mentioned above, it should made also clear that estimation methods used in this section do not take into account the counterfactual increasing density distributions generated by the model. However, as discussed in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) , the model is identi…ed. In Table 5 I report means for variables of interest. 16 Descriptive statistics show what women have somewhat higher non-employment rate and duration of it. Note also the di¤erence between average earnings is higher than the di¤erence between average o¤ers, 23% against 13%, indicating di¤erent e¤ects of transition parameters on the distribution across men and women at di¤erent stages of their careers.
General results deriving from the solution of the system above for the pooled sample of matching moments estimation are reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 6 . In columns (2) and (3), maximum likelihood nonparametric estimates obtained in previous section are reported for comparison purposes. Results indicate that maximum likelihood estimates are always higher. In particular, while arrival rates of o¤ers are very similar across estimation methods, the destruction rate takes quite di¤erent values. Actually, using maximum likelihood methods it is twice as high as the one estimated with matching techniques. However, for the analysis of equilibrium wage di¤erentials, what is really important is the ratio between the arrival rate of o¤ers and the job destruction rate k e = e = . In this case, for males results are k e = 0:5 and k e = 0:32 for nonparametric and matching methods respectively. For women, corresponding values are k e = 0:2 and k e = 0:26. Estimates with nonparametric methods indicate big di¤erences in the speed of climbing the wage ladder, whereas these di¤erences are substantially reduced when using matching moments. 17 Finally, note that estimation of average productivity with nonparametric methods turned in implausible high results, due by di¢ culties in estimation of the earnings density. To analyse the di¤erential e¤ect of productivity, search and discrimination, in next steps, I continue using matching estimates. Previous exercise gives interesting insights, however, it doesn't provide any evidence on identi…cation of the source of the gender wage di¤erential as discussed in the preceding section. What I try to assess here is the extent to which di¤erent sources of the wage di¤erentials contribute to the wage gender gap. I do this in the following way. Parameters are divided in productivity parameters P , transition parameters: u ; ; e , and discrimination parameters: x, d, d : They are all de…ned in the theoretical section. Note I allow transition parameters and productivity to vary across men and women. The …rst discrimination parameter x indicates if …rms search less intensively for women than for men. So, if …rms search equally x = 1, otherwise x < 1; d is the …rm disutility parameter, and …nally d is the proportion of …rms that discriminate (not necessarily the proportion of those that do not hire women).
The detailed identi…cation strategy for each computation is outlined below. 18 1. In this case, there are no di¤erences in transition parameters M = W , no di¤erences in productivity P M = P W and no discrimination x = 1, d = 0,
It is relatively easy to solve the system of equations by referring to mean values for the whole sample. The arrival rate of o¤ers while unemployed u is identi…ed from average unemployment duration u dur in equation (8); the arrival rate of o¤ers while unemployed e is identi…ed from the proportion of jobs terminating into unemployment jtu in equation (10) . The (common) job destruction rate is identi…ed from the unemployment rate u rate in equation (9) . Given a common reservation wage R, estimated as the smallest observed wage in the sample, the value of the common productivity parameter P is identi…ed by the mean of the earnings distribution E G(w) in equation (11). 2. The second step allows productivity levels to di¤er across men and women P M 6 = P W while transition parameters M = W are estimated exactly as in previous item (1) . No discrimination is allowed at this stage, x = 1, d = 0, d = 0. Given a common reservation wage R, di¤erent productivity levels are identi…ed by di¤erent average earnings for men and women E M G(w) and E W G(w) respectively.
3. In a no discrimination scenario, x = 1, d = 0, d = 0, in this item, di¤erent job destruction rates M and W are identi…ed by using di¤erent unemployment rates for men and women after estimating a common arrival rate of offers while unemployed u from average unemployment duration u dur . Again, arrival rates of o¤ers and productivity levels P M 6 = P W , are estimated as in item (2) by using di¤erent mean earnings for men and women and (common) unemployment duration and the overall proportion of exits to unemployment respectively.
4. Arrival rates, job destruction rates and di¤erent productivity levels are identi…ed exactly as in (3) with P M 6 = P W , M 6 = W . The search intensity for the two groups is the same by keeping x = 1. Discrimination is considered, whereas the two parameters d and d , that represent the disutility parameter for discriminating …rms and the proportion of them respectively, are identi…ed. The parameter d is identi…ed by average value of the offer distribution for women E W F (w) in equation (15) in the Appendix. The parameter d is identi…ed by the the women/men median wage di¤erential by using G W (w median )=G M (w median ) by using equations (13) and (12) in the Appendix.
5. By considering di¤erent search intensities, at this point, it is imposed x = 0:85 so that di¤erent search intensity is revealed in di¤erent durations of unemployment for men and women. In this case, d and d are identi…ed as in item (4). The arrival rates, di¤erent job destruction rates M 6 = W , and di¤erent productivities P M 6 = P W , are identi…ed as in previous scenario. 19 6. Finally, the pure discrimination case identi…es transition parameters u ; e and M 6 = W as in previous steps, and the common value of productivity 19 The parameter x should be identi…ed by di¤erent durations by using u (17) in the Appendix, and x = 0:85 is imposed.
Results are summarised in Table 7 in di¤erent columns. First, comparison of results from column (1) and (2) indicates that not considering productivity di¤er-entials can miss important things. Infact, in the second step, introducing di¤er-ences in productivity, women have much lower measures of productivity parameter to account for the observed wage di¤erential. Allowing both productivity and job destruction rates to be di¤erent (in 3) indicates that productivity for women is not as lower as estimated before in column (2) and that their destruction rate is higher. In column (4), the role of discrimination is considered. Although the intensity of recruitment activity for both workers is the same, there is a proportion of prejudiced …rms (17%) having a disutility parameter upon hiring women. Then, in column (5), I include discrimination as a possible explanation of wage di¤erentials and di¤erent unemployment durations for the two groups. Note that the proportion of discriminating …rm increases. The arrival rates di¤er between men and women, and results indicate that productivity of women is about 19% lower than productivity of men; about 27% of …rms discriminate when hiring and their disutility parameter is equal to about 47% of males'productivity parameter. Finally, in column (6) the pure discrimination case is considered with equal productivity; however note results are not plausible, with a negative disutility parameter.
It is interesting to compare these results with those obtained by Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and Flabbi (2005) for racial and gender di¤erentials in the US labour market respectively. The former paper estimates black's productivity to be about 3.3% lower than the productivity of white workers with a disutility taste parameter equal to 31% of the productivity of whites. The proportion of discriminating …rms is equal to 56%. The paper by Flabbi (2005) estimates that about half of employers are prejudiced and the productivity of women is 6.5% lower than the estimated parameter for men. The disutility factor is estimated to be about 36% of men's productivity.
Previous results indicate search, productivity and discrimination have important roles in shaping the gender wage di¤erential. However, it is important to provide a measure of their relative contributions. This decomposition exercise is provided in some important studies in the equilibrium search literature. In a model of search with heterogeneity in productivity but no discrimination, Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) …nd that about 73% of wage variance is due to productivity variation, while the rest is due to search frictions. They suggest this is in line with the R 2 from standard wage regressions. On the other hand, Bowlus (1997) …nds that behavioural di¤erences, as re ‡ected in di¤erent transition parameters, account for about 20-30% of the di¤erential. More speci…cally, decomposition of wage o¤er means shows the search components account for around 20%, while this component is about 30% for the earnings distribution.
To calculate the relative contribution of search, productivity and discrimination, using equations from (14) to (17) in the Appendix, and previous parameters estimates, I calculate predicted mean wage o¤ers and earnings for both men and women respectively. Di¤erent scenarios allowing for di¤erent components are presented. First note that the raw wage o¤er gap is equal to 0.88 against the earnings gap of 0.81. This is not surprising as the e¤ect of the three components on the gender gap can be di¤erent after some experience accumulated in the labour market. In Table 8 I report results for simulations. 20 As I said before, interestingly, the gap is di¤erent for wage o¤ers and earnings distributions. The procedure to calculate relative contributions is the following. I assume in absence of all forces, there is no gender di¤erential. First, I look at earnings distribution. From row (1) I calculate 0.22 as the role of productivity by subtracting 1-0.78; then from (2) I obtain 0.11 as the contribution of search di¤erences. The sum of discrimination and productivity is obtained by (5) as 0.35, then discrimination is calculated as di¤erence 0.35-0.22, this gives 0.13, the latter is the contribution of discrimination. Then I compare results in (3) and (4) with predictions for the e¤ect of search and productivity (0.33) and search (3) there is small di¤erence and in (4) the …t is good. Finally I can calculate the relative contributions of search, productivity and discrimination in the two cases, both for wage o¤ers and earnings distribution.
Results indicate di¤erences for wage o¤ers and earnings. In the …rst case the percentages are as follows: 61% for productivity, 28% for search and 11% for discrimination, in the second case these are 48%, 24% and 28%. Interestingly, productivity di¤erences are more relevant for wage o¤ers than for earnings, while discrimination is much more important to explain the earnings gap. The role of search behaviour is very similar in both cases. 21 
Conclusions
This paper provides estimates of the relevant frictional parameters of the equilibrium search model to analyse gender wage di¤erentials. Two di¤erent versions of the model are estimated. The …rst is a model in which men and women are in separate markets but …rms are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity parameter. The second one, is a model without a distribution of productivity but where men and women can have di¤erent productivity levels and discrimination is explicitly taken into account.
The …rst model is estimated assuming an exogenous continuous distribution of …rms'productivity to get a good …t of the wage distribution. First, the earnings distribution is estimated non-parametrically; then these estimates are used to recover frictional parameters using maximum likelihood methods. Conditional on previous steps, in the third stage, an estimate of the productivity distribution is provided. Results indicate that search frictions are important source of the gender wage di¤erential. The quantitative measure of search frictions indicates that men climb the wage ladder much faster than women. Looking at di¤erent age groups, it turns out that this speed increases and then decreases with experience for men, while it is always increasing for women. This can indicate that labour market transitions of women can be in ‡uenced by many factors, including the family environment and child rearing. For both groups, wages are increasing function of productivity levels; however, while for men the relationship is not linear, for women is almost linear. In other words, …rms with high productivity are able to o¤er proportionally higher wages to men to retain or attract them, they do not need to do it for women. When estimating the model with taste discrimination and no heterogeneity in the productivity distribution, results indicate the relative contribution of search, productivity and discrimination is di¤erent for the wage o¤er and earnings distribution. In the …rst case, productivity accounts for 61% of wage di¤erentials, while the part of search is 28% and 11% is the component of discrimination. The earnings distribution is di¤erently a¤ected: the relative contributions are 48%, 24% and 28% respectively. Interestingly, productivity di¤erences are more relevant for wage o¤ers than for earnings distribution, while discrimination is much more important to explain the earnings gap. The role of search behaviour is very similar in both cases. This paper contributes to the literature dealing with the structural estimation of equilibrium search models. It also proposes an application of such models to study gender labour market di¤erentials in terms of wages and unemployment in Italy. To the extent that gender di¤erentials are also widely recognised in all labour markets, studying the di¤erent sources of wage di¤erentials (search, productivity and discrimination) is important to shed some light on possible policy interventions to reduce wage and unemployment inequalities. In particular, some policy experiments as equal pay policies or a¢ rmative actions can be implemented in such an environment.
